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Colours and Appearances as Powers and Manifestations 
Max Kistler  
Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) 
mkistler@univ-paris1.fr 
 
Forthcoming in: Jonathan Jacobs (ed.), Putting Powers to Work: Causal Powers in 
Contemporary Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Humans have only finite discriminatory capacities. This simple fact seems to be 
incompatible with the existence of appearances. As many authors have noted, the hypothesis 
that appearances exist seems to be refuted by reductio: Let A, B, C be three uniformly 
coloured surfaces presented to a subject in optimal viewing conditions, such that A, B, and C 
resemble one another perfectly except with respect to their colours. Their colours differ 
slightly in the following way: the difference between A and B and the difference between B 
and C are below the discrimination threshold, but the difference between A and C is above 
this threshold. According to an intuitive construal of what an appearance is, given that A and 
B appear (to the subject) identical in colour, A and B have the same (colour
1
) appearance P1; 
likewise, B and C have the same appearance P2. B’s appearance is both P1 and P2. This seems 
to imply that P1=P2. But then, A and C also have the same appearance, which contradicts the 
hypothesis that A and C are discriminable. If A and C are discriminable with respect to their 
colour, they do not have the same appearance with respect to colour.  
The paradox arising from such a series of judgments of sameness or difference 
between pairs of coloured surfaces seems to belong to the class of sorites paradoxes. Here is 
Armstrong’s way of raising the issue.  
“If A is exactly similar to B in respect X, and B is exactly similar to C in respect X, 
then it follows of logical necessity, that A is exactly similar to C in respect X. ‘Exact 
similarity in a particular respect’ is necessarily a transitive relation. Now suppose that we 
have three samples of cloth, A, B, and C, which are exactly alike except that they differ very 
slightly in colour. Suppose further, however, that A and B are perceptually completely 
indistinguishable in respect of colour, and B and C are perceptually completely 
                                                
1
 If not stated otherwise, it will be tacitly understood in what follows that the appearances I speak of are colour 
appearances. 
 2 
indistinguishable in respect of colour. Suppose, however, that A and C can be perceptually 
distinguished from each other in this respect.” (Armstrong 1968, p. 218) 
Armstrong uses the paradox arising from the non-transitivity of non-discriminability to 
argue against the existence of sense-data
2
. The concept of sense data has widely been 
abandoned for reasons independent from the present problem
3
. However, Armstrong’s 
argument can be reconstructed so as to refute the existence of appearances, or “looks” (as we 
will call visual appearances) on any construal, not only in terms of sense data. When a subject 
looks at a uniformly coloured surface S, the colour of S will look to the subject a certain way, 
so that there seems to be a look, which is part of the content of her perception
4
.  
According to Armstrong’s argument, the existence of looks (for him: sense data) is 
refuted by a reductio. If there were looks, they would have contradictory properties; therefore 
there are no looks. Here is how he presents the reasoning. “Now consider the situation if we 
hold a ‘sensory item’ view of perception. If the pieces of cloth A and B are perceptually 
indistinguishable in colour, it will seem to follow that the two sensory items A1 and B1 that 
we have when we look at the two pieces actually are identical in colour. For the sensory 
items are what are supposed to make a perception the perception it is, and here, by hypothesis, 
the perceptions are identical. In the same way B1 and C1 will be sensory items that are 
identical in colour. Yet, by hypothesis, sensory items A1 and C1 are not identical in colour!” 
(Armstrong 1968, p. 218).  
In what follows, I will show that there is a way to construe colours and their 
appearances in a way that does not fall prey to the reduction just sketched. 
 
2. An analysis in terms of powers and manifestations 
 
The concepts of power, disposition and manifestation may help to describe the 
situation without any contradiction. Objective colours, as well as other perceived properties, 
are powers. This is certainly not a new idea. On the contrary, it is, since Locke’s analysis in 
the Essay (1689), one of the most influential conceptions of colour, which has many followers 
                                                
2
 In a similar way, Dummett (1975) argues from this paradox to the non-existence of phenomenal qualities. 
According to Wright (1975), it shows that colour predicates are not observational, which means that a subject 
cannot tell just by observation whether such a predicate correctly applies to a given surface or not.  
3
 Cf. Barnes (1945), Fish (2010). 
4
 This can be said independently of the metaphysical interpretation of the situation: in the perspective of 
adverbialist theories of perception, the way S looks to a subject T is a property of T (or of an event involving T). 
In the perspective of intentionalist theories, it is part of the content of a representation T forms at the occasion of 
this experience. Jackson and Pinkerton (1973, p. 269) are wrong in thinking that the argument can be generalized 
only “against any act-object, as opposed to adverbial, style of analysis of sensations”. 
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in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. To mention only one of them: “I therefore elucidate colours as 
powers, in Locke’s sense, to evoke certain sorts of discriminatory responses in human beings. 
They are also, of course, powers to cause sensations in human beings (an account still nearer 
Locke’s)” (Smart 1959, p. 149). 
I suggest introducing a new twist in the analysis of colours as powers, which is the key 
to overcoming the sorites paradox threatening the existence of appearances. Colours are what 
have traditionally been called “multi-track” dispositions. I think the best way to understand 
them is this
5
. Colours as objective properties of the surfaces of objects are powers. Such a 
power grounds, not a single disposition to manifest itself in one way, but a whole set of 
dispositions. For each context of observation of a given coloured surface, the colour grounds a 
disposition to appear to a given observer
6
. The appearance is a manifestation that is specific to 
the power, the observer, and the context.  
Part of what makes the concept of colour puzzling is that a coloured surface of an 
object can, without itself at all changing in any intrinsic respect, vary in the way it looks, due 
to various changes that are external to the object and the intrinsic properties of its surface: 
among variations that may make the object look different with respect to its colour are 
changes in lighting, changes in the atmosphere and changes in the subject perceiving the 
object, neurophysiological or psychological. The conception of the colour of an object as a 
power makes it belong to the class of objectivist theories of colour. According to the power 
view, the physiology and psychology of the perceiving subject do not determine the objective 
colour of perceived objects, but they contribute to determining how the colour appears to the 
subject. Such appearances are manifestations of the objective powerful colour property. A 
given determinate objective colour can appear differently to different subjects, and to one 
subject at different times because one objective power grounds many different dispositions to 
manifest itself. Consider the set of all possible factors that may determine the look of a 
specific determinate colour. Triggering conditions are sets of these factors. In each situation, 
the power, together with the triggering condition and the laws of nature, determines how the 
colour will manifest itself. For each triggering situation, there is a well determined 
disposition: If a subject is in triggering situation Ti (composed, among other factors, of 
                                                
5
 Here I use the account of dispositions and powers suggested in Kistler (2012). 
6
 As one anonymous referee has suggested, it might seem simpler to cut out the concept of disposition from this 
picture, and just say that a power can manifest in different ways. However, the concept of disposition is useful in 
making explicit the relation between the power and its manifestations, especially with respect to those 
manifestations that are only possible but not actual. To each possible manifestation that the power gives objects 
possessing it, corresponds one actual disposition. Instead of saying that the power can manifest, i.e. does 
possibly manifest itself, in different ways, the use of the concept of disposition makes it possible to say that 
objects that have the power (powerful property) actually have a whole range of dispositions to manifest. 
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lighting conditions as well as neurophysiological and psychological conditions), then colour C 
will manifest itself in colour appearance Ai. In the context of sorites arguments, the most 
important dispositions are those of judging whether one colour appears the same or different 
with respect to a second colour. In Armstrong’s example considered above, the objective 
colour of item B grounds (together with a great many natural circumstances, such as the 
presence of light, of a well functioning perceptual apparatus and nervous system) the 
disposition of a subject to judge that B has the same colour as A
7
, in a typical situation 
(“triggering condition”) in which she is shown B next to A. The judgment is the manifestation 
of the disposition
8
.  
Let us now have a closer look at the structure of the “sorites” argument that seems to 
refute the existence of appearances on the basis of a contradiction that can be derived from the 
fact that the indiscriminability of colours is non-transitive. Following Raffman (2000), Fara 
(2001), and others, I will call this argument “Nontrans”. Let A, B and C be objects with very 
similar colours, as described in the quote from Armstrong above. The argument presupposes 
three principles. 
 
(SP Sameness Principle
9
) For all objects x, y, for all subjects s of experience of type S, 
if x looks the same as y with respect to some perceptual dimension R, there is an appearance 
(or a “look”
10
) X, such that X is the appearance of x and X is the appearance of y. 
(DP Difference principle) For all objects w, z, for all subjects s of experience of type 
S, if w looks different from z with respect to some perceptual dimension R, there is an 
appearance W, such that W is the appearance of w and there is an appearance Z, such that Z is 
the appearance of z, and W ! Z. 
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 This is not exactly the same as judging that A and B are indiscriminable. The terms “discriminable” and 
“indiscriminable” designate themselves capacities, which may manifest themselves in the long run, even if they 
do not in a single trial. Hardin (1988) shows that a scientific experiment may well establish that a subject can 
discriminate A and B in the long run, in the sense that she will more often than random judge that A is different 
from B, even if she will judge in many individual occasions that she can see no difference between them. More 
significant still, an experiment conducted with many subjects may well show that A and B are objectively 
discriminable even if many subjects judge them equal on many occasions, and maybe be also if some individuals 
always judge them equal, on all occasions. See below, section 5. 
8
 I put aside here two further distinctions: 1) the judgment may or not be expressed. I take the most immediate 
manifestation to be the mental act (Raffman 2000, Proust 2001, 2010) of judging, whether or not it gives rise to a 
public expression. 2) I will also neglect the distinction between the mental act of attending to a pair of stimuli 
and the act of making the judgment itself (Raffman 2000, p. 158).  
9
 Here is how Fara expresses the Sameness Principle: “x looks to be the same colour as y ! !c(x looks to have c 
& y looks to have c)” (Fara 2001, p. 914). 
10
 I will use “appearance” and “look” interchangeably in this paper, except when stated otherwise: “appearance” 
is more general and can also be applied to sensory modalities other than vision, whereas “look” applies only to 
visual perception. 
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(UP Uniqueness Principle) For all objects x, for all subjects s of experience of type S 
for each respect R in which x can appear to subjects s, there is a unique
11
 appearance X, such 
that: for all times t, if x is presented at t to s in conditions that are normal (or optimal) with 
respect to the perception of aspect R, then x appears to s as X. 
With SP, DP, and UP, one can derive a contradiction from the existence of a situation 
in which indiscrimability is nontransitive. Such situations have the formal structure described 
in premises 1-3.  
 
1 A looks to be the same colour as B. 
2 B looks to be the same colour as C. 
3 A looks to be a different colour from C. 
 
4 (1, SP) There is a look A1, such that A has look A1 and B has look A1. 
5 (2, SP) There is a look C2, such that B has look C2 and C has look C2. 
6 (3, DP) There is a look A3 and a look C3, such that: A has A3 and C has C3 and A3 ! C3. 
 
7 (4, 6, UP) A1=A3. 
8 (4, 5, UP) A1=C2. 
9 (5, 6, UP) C2=C3. 
10 (7, 8) A3=C2. 
11 (9, 10) A3=C3. 
12 (6, 11) A3=C3 and A3 ! C3. 
 
The contradiction in line 12 has been derived from three premises (1-3), together with 
three principles, SP, DP, and UP. Which of these premises should be abandoned? 
It seems impossible to deny the possibility of situations in which premises 1-3 are all 
true. All three principles (SP, DP, and UP) presuppose the existence of looks. This leaves 
open several possibilities. One may conclude, following Armstrong, that there are no looks, 
which implies that SP, DP and UP are all false. But the argument does certainly not provide 
by itself a sufficient reason to draw such a radical conclusion. It is worth exploring other less 
radical options. Of the three principles, DP seems to be the least problematic. If one supposes 
that there are appearances, and more particularly in this case, looks with respect to colour, it 
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 X is meant to be a type, not a token. 
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seems unavoidable that two things that look different have different looks
12
. However, SP and 
UP can be questioned and have been questioned. 
In what follows, I will examine some analyses of the problem raised by the apparent 
non-transitivity of indiscriminability that deny either SP or UP. None of them makes essential 
use of the notions of power and manifestation. My strategy will be to check whether these 
analyses can accommodate the following intuitions. 
(NTI: Nontransitivity of indiscriminability) There are series of objective colours (or 
other objective perceivable properties) such that indiscriminability between adjacent pairs of 
elements of the series is non-transitive. 
(EL: Existence of looks) There are looks: aspects of perceptual experience that are 
directly accessible to the subject and perfectly known to her, i.e. known completely and 
infallibly.  
It will turn out that none of the analyses in the literature is compatible with both NTI 
and EL. However, as I will show, if looks are construed as manifestations of powers, NTI and 
EL can both be accepted. 
Armstrong (1968) and Dummett (1975) accept NTI and deny EL. They take Nontrans 
to be valid, and conclude that it refutes the existence of looks by reductio. Wright (1975) 
argues that Nontrans shows that predicates that seem to express looks (observational 
predicates) are incoherent. I will not explore such radical conclusions any further here. 
Rather, my aim is to explore whether it is possible to acknowledge NTI and nevertheless save 
EL, i.e. the existence of looks. I take NTI to be uncontroversial and will not try to justify it 
here. 
 
3. Denying UP 
 
It is psychologically plausible that UP is wrong. Indeed, the appearance of some object 
O in a given respect does not only depend on the objective features of the object, on the 
physiology of the subject and the viewing conditions, but also on the context in which O is 
seen. In the case of colour vision, many experiments show that the appearance of the colour of 
O is influenced by other coloured objects which are part of the same visual scene as O. 
Appearances are “shifty”, to use Hellie’s (2005, p. 487) expression. Without UP, the reductio 
does not go through because a given objective property doesn’t give rise to a unique context-
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 To my knowledge, DP has not been questioned (except indirectly, by questioning the existence of appearances 
as such). 
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independent appearance, which could then be used as the middle term in a sorites argument. 
Without UP, step 8 in the above argument is blocked: 
8 (4, 5, UP) A1=C2. 
Thus, one cannot derive the fact that B’s look, when seen together with A (A1 
according to step 4) is identical to B’s look, when seen together with C (C2, according to step 
5). 
To deny UP is to suppose that it is possible that B’s appearance in the context of a 
judgment of comparison with A (which I will call “B1 (A1)”) is not identical with B’s 
appearance in the context of a judgment of comparison with C (which I will call “B1 (C1)”). 
The present hypothesis is that B1 (C1) may differ from B1 (A1). If B1 (A1) ! B1 (C1), no 
paradox can be constructed any more. Therefore, to avoid the paradox, it is not necessary to 
deny the Sameness principle as well. 
Both Robinson (1972) and Jackson and Pinkerton (1973) have shown that 1) (a 
premise equivalent to) UP is not plausible “in view of the familiar fact of perceptual 
relativity” (Jackson and Pinkerton 1973, p. 270), because “the same object can have various 
sense data” (Robinson 1972, p. 85), corresponding to its appearance in various circumstances, 
and 2) without (a premise equivalent to) UP, “the paradox vanishes” (Robinson 1972, p. 85). 
However, it is not enough to show that UP is not true in general, in other words, that it is 
sometimes false. It must be shown that UP is false in the particular situation described by the 
premises of Nontrans. 
Premises SP and UP seem especially plausible in that particular situation insofar as it 
is not made clear whether the two comparisons - of A with B and of B with C - are made 1) 
simultaneously or 2) in succession. On one hand, if the two discriminations are made together 
(at the same time, as it were in one glance), it seems indeed plausible to suppose that B’s look 
is the same when B is seen together with A as B’s look when B is seen together with C. After 
all, there is only one glance in which B appears. On the other hand, if these two comparisons 
are made separately, in succession, it appears to be a substantial assumption that B’s look is 
the same in both comparisons. 
Coloured objects are permanent substances. It is possible, or at least conceivable, that 
their surfaces do not undergo any change in colour during a certain lapse of time. However, 
the looks of such coloured surfaces of objects cannot be assumed to be substances lasting 
through time, and even if some sense could be made of a look lasting for some while, it would 
be difficult to justify the hypothesis that some aspect of that look remained constant through 
time. On the contrary, looks are perceptual events, or aspects of perceptual events, which are 
 8 
in general subject to permanent change. Therefore, if two comparisons (A-B) and (B-C) 
necessarily required two successive perceptions (more precisely, two acts of comparison, 
which are dated mental events), there would necessarily be two looks, B1 (A1), and B1 (C1), 
corresponding to the look of B, when it is seen together with A and compared to A, and to the 
look of B when it is seen together with C and compared to C. But then, given the ephemeral 
character of looks, which is due to their dependence on context, both on what is perceived at 
the same time in other parts of the visual field and on what has been perceived by the subject 
earlier, there is no reason to suppose that these two looks, B1 (A1), and B1 (C1), are identical.  
However, this reasoning presupposes that the two comparisons are necessarily made 
separately. If it were possible that the two comparisons be made with respect to the same look 
B1, one would after all have constructed a situation which leads to a contradiction (and thus 
refutes the existence of looks).  
Both Robinson (1972) and Jackson and Pinkerton (1973)
13
 argue that there are 
necessarily two looks in play, so that no sorites argument can be constructed and no 
contradiction follows. According to Jackson and Pinkerton, the hypothesis that the same look 
(of B: B1) is involved in the comparison of A and B and in the comparison of B and C is 
“logically impossible” (Jackson and Pinkerton 1973, p. 270). “The suggestion that A might 
look to be the same colour as B, B might look to be the same colour as C, while A looks to be 
a different colour from C, to one and the same person at one and the same time, is 
inconsistent”, because this “the suggestion involves one object, B, looking to have two 
different colours at the same time to the same person, which is impossible” (Jackson and 
Pinkerton 1973, p. 271). They agree with Armstrong that this leads to a contradiction, and 
conclude that the hypothesis of the existence of a unique B1 must be rejected
14
.  
However, it remains to be seen whether Robinson’s and Jackson and Pinkerton’s 
defense of the existence of sense data can be adapted to a conception of colour perception that 
does not make use of sense data but only of objective colours and colour appearances. In what 
follows, I shall propose an analysis that 1) justifies abandoning UP while 2) retaining SP and 
EL and 3) is compatible with NTI. Being only concerned with appearances (conceived as 
sense data), neither Robinson (1972) nor Jackson and Pinkerton (1973) raise the latter issue 
with respect to indiscriminability judgments bearing on objective colours of surfaces. 
However, with respect to the appearances of A, B and C, the question of transitivity cannot 
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 Their strategy is taken up by Raffman (2000) and Fara (2001). 
14
 The difference with Armstrong’s conclusion is that they conclude only that UP should be abandoned (there 
can be, in this situation, no unique look involved in two comparisons), where Armstrong takes it that the 
contradiction justifies the more generally conclusion that there are no looks. 
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even be asked: if UP is false, there is no common look of B, which could be used as a “middle 
term” in a sorites argument.  
Once objective colours are taken into consideration, we can construct an even stronger 
argument against UP. If UP were true, i.e. if there was a one-one correspondence between the 
objective colours A, B, C and their looks A1, B1, C1, colours (and the objective properties of 
the objects of perception in general) would be single-track dispositions, as it is tacitly 
understood in the traditional Lockean analysis. However, and surprisingly, if colours were 
single-track dispositions, then, given the one-one correspondence of B and its unique 
manifestation B1, Nontrans would refute not only the existence of looks but also the existence 
of objective colours, which manifest themselves by their looks.  
Here we seem to have a place where “powers may be put to work”. The metaphysical 
analysis of the relations between powers, dispositions, and manifestations shows how reality 
must be structured so that 1) UP can be false, whereas both 2) EL and (3) NTI are true. I will 
make a suggestion along these lines in section 7 below. 
 
4. Denying SP, supposing that representations of colours are exact: 
Goodman/Clark 
 
The most influential strategy to avoid the refutation of looks by Nontrans has been 
introduced by Goodman (1977) and further developed by Clark (1993). In terms of our 
analysis of the logical form of Nontrans, this strategy can be interpreted as based on the 
rejection of the Sameness Principle
15
. Goodman and Clark deny that the fact that two objects 
look the same with respect to colour suffices to establish that there is a property, traditionally 
called appearance or look, that is directly apparent to the subject. Supposing that such a 
property exists leads to the sorites contradiction. However, contrary to Robinson and Jackson 
and Pinkerton, Goodman and Clark’s aim is not merely critical. Indeed, Clark provides a 
positive metaphysical interpretation of colours and looks, which goes beyond finding a way of 
avoiding the conclusion of Nontrans. Discrimination and difference judgments are made by 
subjects on the basis of the perception of objects. Although these judgments bear on external 
objects, they must be made on the basis of some representation which has psychological 
reality. The challenge is to account for this psychological reality without falling into the trap 
of the sorites argument. Goodman and Clark’s strategy is to introduce a new kind of entity 
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 See Fara (2001). 
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that is supposed to take over the role of looks, but differs from looks in being immune to 
sorites arguments. “Qualia”, as Goodman and Clark call them, are psychological entities for 
which there is no principle equivalent to the Sameness Principle. No sorites argument refutes 
their existence even if all other premises are kept, including the Uniqueness Principle. 
Qualia are defined indirectly, with the help of the concept of matching: x and y match 
it they look the same
16
. Two qualia x and y are identical if they do not only match each other 
but if for all other qualia z, either z matches both x and y, or z matches neither x nor y
17
. 
Qualia thus conceived have coherent identity conditions and do not fall prey to any sorites 
argument. The reason is that they do not obey to any principle of the form of the Sameness 
Principle. It is not the case that for all objects x, y, if x looks the same as y with respect to R 
(“if matches y with respect to R”), there is a quale Q such that Q is both part of the content of 
the representation of x and part of the content of the representation of y. It is crucial for the 
concept of qualia that matching of two perceived objects with respect to R is not sufficient for 
the sameness of the qualia caused by the perception of x and y. x and y may well match 
although the qualia by which an observer represents them are not the same. This happens 
precisely in the situation described by the premises of Nontrans. The fact that B matches A is 
not sufficient for their qualia Q(A) and Q(B) to be identical. On the contrary, the fact that 
there is a third item C which matches B without matching A, establishes that qualia Q(A) and 
Q(B) are not identical. 
The problem with this strategy is that it changes the subject rather than solving the 
problem. The aim was to understand how there can be looks although their existence seems to 
be refuted by Nontrans. Goodman and Clark reply that there are no looks, but that their role 
can be taken over by qualia. Qualia in Goodman’s and Clark’s sense are the content of 
representations. They are theoretical properties postulated in order to explain judgments of 
perceptual similarity and dissimilarity (Shepard 1962; 1965). Qualia are subjective, because 
they are the content of representations which are partly determined by constraints imposed by 
the subject, in particular by its neurophysiology. However, qualia, as defined by Goodman 
and Clark are not looks as we use the concept in this paper
18
 because qualia are not known 1) 
directly nor 2) completely nor 3) infallibly by the subject that has them.  
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 Goodman (1977, p. 197) takes the predicate “match” to be basic and provides no analysis.  
17
 Cf. Goodman (1977, p. 196). 
18
 Armstrong considers the possibility of conceiving sense data in a similar way, and criticizes it for similar 
reasons. “The upholder of sensory items” says Armstrong, may “abandon the view that we have incorrigible 
knowledge of the nature of the items at the time of having them” (Armstrong 1968, p. 219). As Armstrong notes, 
such a doctrine would be paradoxical, in the sense that it is incompatible with a central tent of the sense datum 
doctrine. Sense data are defined by the fact that the appearance-reality distinction does not apply to them: They 
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It is part of the concept of a look (or in general, of an appearance) that it is possible for 
the subject to acquire direct knowledge of how things look (or appear) to her. It is essential 
for looks that knowledge of the sameness or difference of the looks of A and B can be 
acquired directly: if A1 and B1 are looks it is sufficient for the subject to inspect A1 and B1 
themselves to know whether they are identical or not. However, the subject cannot tell by 
direct inspection alone whether two items A and B produce the same quale in her 
psychological quality space. The fact that they look exactly the same (“match”) with respect 
to some dimension of perceivable qualities, such as colour, is necessary but not sufficient. If 
there is a third item C that looks different from one (say A) but looks the same as the other 
(B), (in Goodman’s terminology: if there is C which matches B but not A), the quale Q(A) by 
which the subject represents the colour of A is not identical with the quale Q(B) by which the 
subject represents the colour of B. The crucial point is that there are situations where QA!QB 
but where the subject cannot by introspection directly acquire knowledge that QA!QB.  
Moreover, even if A and B match and if it is in fact true that QA=QB, the subject can 
never be certain that QA=QB: It is impossible for the subject to check all third items, which 
might possibly reveal that QA!QB. The identity QA=QB always remains hypothetical. 
Depending on what is taken to be sufficient for knowledge, the subject might nevertheless be 
said to know that QA=QB. Even then however, qualia are not looks because such knowledge 
is not direct: knowledge that QA=QB requires inspection of items that are different from both 
A and B. 
With the help of the concept of qualia, it is possible both 1) to accept that 
indiscriminability is non-transitive (NTI), and 2) nevertheless to maintain that there is 
something, the quale, that has psychological reality and accounts for the way things appear to 
a subject. However, qualia are not looks. Insofar as the Sameness Principle bears on looks, it 
is paradoxical to deny it
19
. Denying it means denying that a subject can tell just by looking 
                                                                                                                                                   
are what they appear to be. Thus it is impossible to say of a sense datum that the very subject to whom it appears 
ignores what it is; for this presupposes that the way it appears to her (and which she knows by immediate 
introspection, or acquaintance) is not what it really is. Broad (1923, p. 244) seems to take sense data to be only 
incompletely known. This seems to be incompatible with the very notion of a sense datum. We might take this to 
be a verbal issue: What Broad calls sense data just are not sense data, in the sense of what appears necessarily as 
what it is, and about which the subject cannot be ignorant. Rather, they might be powers to give rise to sense 
data: powerful properties of the perceptual experience. 
19
 Fara says that it is a “truism” (2001, p. 909) that “if any two colour patches look the same, then if one looks 
red so does the other” (2001, p. 908). She also says that it would be confused to attribute an observational 
predicate such as being red to one object and to deny it to a second item if these two items look the same: “I 
cannot see my way through to the possibility that two colour patches might look the same, yet that ‘looks red’ 
applies to one but not to the other” (Fara 2001, p. 909). Armstrong says that Goodman’s strategy, namely 
“abandon the view that we have incorrigible knowledge of the nature of the items at the time we have them” 
(Armstrong 1968, p. 219), while it is not logically absurd, “is nevertheless most implausible”. Jackson and 
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how things look to her, and denying that a subject can know whether two things that look the 
same really have the same look. It is not paradoxical if the subject’s (partial) ignorance it 
taken to bear, not on how things look, but on the qualia by which their perceptible qualities 
are represented. But then, the paradox arises if qualia are supposed to be appearances which 
do not directly appear to the subject. 
The fact that qualia do not satisfy the conditions we have imposed on looks is no 
reason to deny that they are real. Rather, they can be understood as being real powers. Just as 
a subject of perception has only incomplete knowledge of the objective properties she 
perceives, she has only partial knowledge of her own qualia. Each manifestation gives the 
subject partial knowledge: looks reveal part of the nature of objective colours, but also part of 
the nature of her own qualia. The fact that a subject judges that A and B “match” means that 
the objective colours are very similar, but also that the qualia Q(A) and Q(B), by which she 
represents these objective colours lie close together in her psychological quality space. 
 
5. Denying SP, supposing that representations of colours are inexact: Hardin 
 
According to Hardin (1988) it is an illusion that looks (and apparent colours in 
particular) fall prey to sorites arguments. It stems from an oversimplified conception of looks, 
according to which a look can be exhaustively determined and known by one subject at one 
instant. He shows that this is not the only way to conceive of the psychological basis of 
perceptual appearance, and furthermore that there is an alternative, scientific way of 
conceiving that basis. The value of the scientifically measurable properties in this basis, 
which Hardin misleadingly calls “looks” although, as I shall argue, they are not looks in our 
sense, can be determined by statistical means. Hardin claims that, understood in this way, 
“looks” are immune against refutation by sorites arguments. “If we are prepared to count 
statistical ensembles of observations and observational data – a quite common practice in 
science – Nontrans […] must be rejected” (Hardin 1988, p. 214). Furthermore, the construal 
of looks as objective theoretical properties, which can be determined by direct introspection 
only to a finite degree of precision, paves the way for a coherent “concept of phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                                   
Pinkerton agree that “it is not open to the sensory item theorist to argue that in the kind of case described in the 
above quotation [the non-trans case; MK] the percipient is mistaken about the nature of his sensory items” 
(Jackson and Pinkerton 1973, p. 269). 
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color”, according to which phenomenal colours “are often indeterminate” (Hardin 1988, p. 
214)
20
. 
The statistical treatment of comparisons between colours shows that the judgments 
subjects make of a given pair of colours are not constant, neither for the same subject over 
time, nor within a group of different subjects. Rather, such judgments are spread out in a way 
one would expect from a process in which noise is added to the process of signal treatment
21
. 
One can assume that the factors producing this “noise” are “randomly distributed and thus 
representable by a normal (Gaussian) distribution curve” (Hardin 1988, p. 215). As a result, 
the scientific construal of the appearance of a colour is not a point in colour space (the space 
corresponding to the contents of perceptual representations) but an imprecise value, spread 
around a mean value with a distribution that can be characterized by its standard deviation. 
According to Hardin, this is sufficient to show that “the sorites problem does not arise” (p. 
220). If looks are construed as imprecise theoretical properties, each with its mean value and 
standard deviation, their distributions can overlap. The sorites paradox arises as long as one 
identifies represented properties with single looks, on the basis of single comparison 
judgments of one individual subject at one occasion.  
To one individual (to use our own symbols introduced above), B1 can seem to be the 
same apparent colour as A1, and also seem to be the same apparent colour as C1. However, 
statistical sampling of many judgments of one subject, and of many subjects, will show that 
the look B1 is neither identical with A1, nor with C1. Instead, their characteristic distributions 
overlap. The points in the overlap zone correspond to judgments according to which the two 
looks are equal.  
In the terms of the premises of Nontrans we have distinguished above, Hardin denies 
SP: The observation of a statistically significant sample of comparison judgments of a given 
pair of items (within the triple A, B, C that gives rise to the sorites paradox), say A and B, will 
show that the representations R(A) and R(B) are not identical although they may be judged to 
look equal for many individuals at many occasions.  
However, Hardin’s account accepts UP not only as a plausible empirical hypothesis. 
UP is built into the construal of phenomenal properties: the phenomenal property as which a 
given item A appears to subjects of a given type is defined as the statistical distribution of the 
individual appearances, as they are manifested in various comparison judgments. All 
                                                
20
 Hardin takes care to distinguish this thesis from the claim that it is “just phenomenal color predicates [my 
emphasis] […] [that] are often indeterminate” (Hardin 1988, p. 214). 
21
 Discriminating between colours can be represented as the extraction of “a signal which is transmitted over a 
noisy channel” (Hardin 1988, p. 215). This idea is taken up by Hellie (2005). 
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appearances of one item, to the same subject and to different subjects, are integrated in the 
unique phenomenal property. 
Hardin’s account does not adequately solve our problem of showing that EL and NTI 
are compatible, for two reasons. 
1. Hardin’s “phenomenal colors” (1988, p. 214) are not appearances or looks at 
all. They are theoretical properties, constructed according to a scientific methodology, from a 
third person perspective, on the basis of a statistical evaluation of many first person 
appearance judgments. Knowledge of such “phenomenal properties” can only be acquired 
indirectly. It would be more appropriate to call appearences or looks “phenomenal 
properties”. Hardin’s “phenomenal properties” are ill named: There is no subject to whom 
they appear at any time and who knows them directly, by how they appear. As Goodman’s 
and Clarke’s defence of qualia against the sorites paradox, phenomenal colours as construed 
by Hardin’s are a Pyrrhic victory against the sorites refutation of appearances: Hardin shows 
that there is a property that does not fall prey to the refutation; but it is not an appearance. 
2. Moreover, Hardin’s construal of phenomenal properties as objective 
measurable quantities with a mean value and standard deviation, obtained from the statistical 
treatment of many appearance judgments, does not solve the problem in all generality. As 
Hardin himself admits, “the sorites argument could be resurrected” (Hardin 1988, p. 220) with 
a series of phenomenal colours that are so close together that their difference could not even 
be detected by statistical means, on the basis of a large set of individual comparison 
judgments. If the objective difference in the stimuli is so small that it would take a very large 
number of trials to detect a subjective difference in the ways these stimuli appear to subjects, 
it seems practically impossible to avoid changes in the experimental situation. In such cases, 
“the signal gets buried in the noise” (Hardin 1988, p. 220). This means that, given the 
practically limited number of trials, the distribution curves that ground the objective 
distinctness of different looks are themselves not infinitely sharp. As a consequence, there are 
“phenomenal colours”, i.e. distribution curves, that are so close together that they cannot be 
distinguished by statistical means. Sorites arguments can be constructed with respect to such 
phenomenal colours. A series of very close distribution curves can serve as premises of an 
argument that has exactly the same structure as Nontrans. There is a series of phenomenal 
colours, such that they appear equal even in the long run to a large group of observers, 
although the first and last in the series appear different to them. Therefore, there are no such 
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phenomenal colours, scientifically construed on the basis of the statistical evaluation of a 
large number of appearance judgments
22
. 
Hardin’s own reply to this problem is that “it doesn’t arise in everyday color-
attributing practice” (1988, p. 221), and that it has “little bearing on a rational reconstruction 
of the rules governing color predicates in a public language since such predicates are 
necessarily much coarser than the fine grains of just noticeably different colors perceivable by 
particular individuals” (1988, p. 221). This fact shows that the problem doesn’t threaten the 
meaning of ordinary language predicates
23
; however, it does not save the existence of 
“phenomenal colors” from refutation by sorites arguments. 
 
6. Denying SP, supposing that representations of colours are inexact: Hellie 
 
Both Hellie (2005) and Zeimbekis (2009) argue that the paradox of Nontrans can be 
avoided by conceiving perceived qualities as determinables, corresponding to regions, not 
points, in quality space. 
Let us suppose that phenomenal qualities, such as colours, sizes and shapes, are 
representations in a psychological quality space, i.e. a psychological space of the content of 
the representations of perceived qualities (Shepard 1962; 1965). Let us suppose that hues can 
be represented in a 2-dimensional surface in a psychological colour space (Shepard 1962). 
Determinate and determinable predicates and properties can be ordered in a series: coloured is 
a determinable relative to red, and red is a determinable relative to scarlet. Each determinable 
colour corresponds to a part of the colour surface. The higher a represented colour is in the 
determinate-determinable hierarchy, the larger is the corresponding surface: the surface 
corresponding to scarlet is a proper part of the surface corresponding to red. “Super-
determinates” (Funkhouser 2006) lie at the bottom of the hierarchy: they are perfectly 
determinate and correspond to points in the psychological quality space. 
Zeimbekis argues that the empirical limitations in the discrimination powers of any 
real cognitive system make it “impossible for any discrimination system to discriminate 
super-determinate shape and size properties” (Zeimbekis 2009, p. 352). He concludes that 
“phenomenal sizes and shapes are determinable types” (Zeimbekis 2009, p. 346), in the sense 
                                                
22
 In a similar vein, Raffman (2000) judges that « the statistical relation defined by the psychologists seems 
equally likely to be nontransitive: there are or can be three stimuli A, B, and C such that, e.g. A and B are judged 
different only 40 percent of the time (hence are indiscriminable), and similarly B and C, but A and C are judged 
different 70 percent of the time (hence are discriminably different). » (2000, p. 157). 
23
 Therefore, it can be used as a defense against Wright (1975). 
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that each phenomenal size corresponds to a whole region of determinate objective sizes. 
However, Zeimbekis does not conclude that phenomenal appearances are determinables as 
appearances, i.e. in the sense of corresponding to an extended region of representations. For 
Zeimbekis, appearances are determinables only relative to the objective properties they 
represent. “Phenomenal sizes […] stand in a determination relation to objective sizes” 
(Zeimbekis 2009, p. 353).   
By contrast, Hellie (2005) takes phenomenal properties, i.e. representations of 
objective properties acquired through perception, to be “inexact” as appearances, in the sense 
that the identity of a phenomenal property corresponds to an extended region in the 
psychological space of representation. Hellie represents the situation establishing the non-
transitivity of indiscriminability in the following way: R(A, e) is the representation of a colour 
A in experience e. It corresponds to a region in psychological quality space that contains A. 
According to Hellie, the fact that A and B are indiscriminable in experience e means that the 
representations of the colours of A and B overlap: There can be “indiscriminability without 
sameness of representation” (Hellie 2005, p. 485). This is equivalent to a denial of (SP). 
Hellie explicitly makes the hypothesis that the phenomenology of the represented 
properties has exactly the same structure as the representations. The consequence is that the 
subject does not perfectly well know the phenomenal properties. His account “allows for 
indiscriminability without sameness of phenomenology” (Hellie 2005, p. 496). In this sense, 
Hellie’s analysis suffers from the same defect as Hardin’s: Representations corresponding to 
extended surfaces in psychological quality space are not looks and should better not be called 
“phenomenal”, because the subject does not know them directly and exhaustively. In 
particular, the subject who perceives A and B, which look the same, does not know just by 
looking (in experience e) whether A’s and B’s phenomenal colours R(A, e) and R(B, e) are 
identical or just overlapping. I take it to be incompatible with the notion of phenomenology 
that there are phenomenological facts that are not directly accessible to the subject herself.  
 
7. Looks as Manifestations of Powers 
 
Let us take stock, and answer the question we have started with, whether there is a 
way to account for the phenomena of appearance that is compatible both with  
 
(EL Existence of looks) There are looks: aspects of perceptual experience that are 
directly accessible to the subject and perfectly known to her, and 
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 (NTI Nontransitivity of indiscriminability) There are series of objective colours (or 
other objective perceivable properties) such that indiscriminability between adjacent pairs of 
elements of the series is non-transitive. 
 
We have seen that it is possible to acknowledge the possibility of situations such as 
those described by the premises of Nontrans, and still avoid the contradiction that Nontrans 
derives from these premises. This is possible by rejecting at least one of DP, UP or SP, 
without rejecting the existence of looks as such. I have argued that DP and SP cannot be 
rejected without threatening the existence of looks and the intuition that they are directly and 
completely known by the subject, by the very experience in which they are present to the 
subject. A subject would not know how things appear to her if it were possible (as it is if SP is 
denied) that 1) she judges A and B to look the same, but that nevertheless 2) the look of A 
differs from the look of B. Thus, the existence of looks can only be justified if SP is 
maintained. The same reasoning shows that the existence of looks requires DP: A subject 
would not know how things appear to her if it were possible (as it is if DP is denied) that 1) 
she judges A and B to look different, but that nevertheless 2) the look of A is identical to the 
look of B. Abandoning SP or DP is equivalent to abandoning the idea of looks as immediately 
and perfectly known to the subject on the basis of the very experience of having them. In 
other words, SP and DP are constitutive of the conception of looks as immediately and 
completely known to the subject. If two things look the same with respect to R, there is a look 
they share; and if two things look different with respect to R, there are two different looks.  
At this point, the only way to save the existence of looks from contradiction is by 
dropping UP. We have already seen that this fits well with the hypothesis that colours and 
other perceptible properties are “multi-track” powers. Given that the context contributes to 
determine how things appear, how an object looks to subject S1 will in general differ from 
how it appears to subject S2, even if viewing conditions are normal, or optimal; and how an 
object looks to S1 at t1 will in general differ from how it looks to S1 at t2. For each perspective 
and each context, there is a different disposition grounded on the relevant properties of the 
object, to manifest itself in the mind of an observer. This is equivalent to the negation of UP: 
it means that it is not the case that a given object manifests itself, with respect to a given 
perceptible aspect, such as colour, with a unique look. 
There remains an important obstacle on the way to an adequate construal of looks. We 
have found that extant analyses of appearances, qualia, or “phenomenal colours” are all 
incompatible with EL, according to which looks are immediately and completely known to 
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the subjects to which they appear, by the very fact that they appear to the subject. On the other 
hand, Robinson’s and Jackson and Pinkerton’s analysis justifies the existence of looks, but 
only in the framework of the theory of sense data. In that framework, NTI does not make 
sense because discrimination judgments are not taken to bear on objective colours, but rather 
on sense data. 
I can here only sketch how manifestations of powerful objective colours can comply 
with the intuitive constraints expressed in EL. This is possible if looks are construed as (parts 
of) the contents of acts of comparison. Let us suppose that these acts are judgments
24
. 
According to this hypothesis, if a subject judges that A looks the same as B, A’s look is 
constituted by the fact that it is equal to B’s look. If the subject judges that A looks similar or 
different from B with respect to its colour, A’s look consists in A’s similarity or difference 
with respect to B’s look. The only way to comply with EL is to suppose that the content of the 
judgment exhausts the appearance: there is nothing more about the look of A than how S 
judges it to be at a given moment. Of course, this hypothesis raises a lot of new questions. 
One may immediately worry that this account of appearances gives rise to a regress: the look 
of A can only be constituted by a judgment of its sameness or difference with respect to B if 
the look of B is already known.  
The hypothesis that appearances are constituted by acts of comparison has important 
consequences. One consequence is that it is incompatible with the thesis of the 
representational theory of phenomenal consciousness (Dretske 1995) that a subject’s 
representing a property is sufficient for the property to appear to the subject. Our hypothesis 
leads to the result that representing a property is not sufficient for the property’s appearing to 
the subject. Perceptual judgments require representations because they are mental acts that 
have representations as objects; but the very existence of the representations does not 
guarantee that the subject directs her attention to them nor that she will make a judgment 
bearing on them. Phenomena such as change blindness and inattentional blindness
25
 seem to 
be incompatible with a pure representational theory, insofar as they seem to show that a 
subject can represent many things and events without their appearing to her. Our hypothesis 
can account for these phenomena. The hypothesis that the appearance results from a 
                                                
24
 Raffman suggests that looks are constituted by judgments. “I shall speak indifferently of patches’ looking red 
and being judged to look red” (Raffman 1994, p. 45; emphasis Raffman’s). According to Raffman, looks can 
arise either from discriminatory judgments, which I am presently considering, or from categorical judgments, 
when one colour is judged to belong to a perceptual category stored in memory. It is controversial whether there 
is a notion of judgment that can be applied the comparison judgments I am considering and that does not rely on 
the use of concepts. If all judgments make use of concepts, the hypothesis remains open that at least some 
appearances precede such judgments (Zeimbekis 2012).  
25
 Most (2010). 
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perceptual judgment fits with the fact that a subject is “blind” to objects and events it 
represents but to which it does not direct its attention. Perceptual judgment requires directing 
one’s attention to a perceived object or fact. Here is a question which calls for further 
empirical and conceptual work: is perceptual attention in itself sufficient for making things 
appear, or do they only begin to “look” a certain way once they have been made objects of 
perceptual judgments? We cannot explore such questions here; however, they suggest that it 
is fruitful to conceive appearances as manifestations of powers.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Starting with an analysis of a famous apparent paradox arising from a series of 
judgments of perceptual comparisons with stimuli so similar that their difference lies under 
the discrimination threshold, our aim was to find out whether there is a metaphysical picture 
of perception and its objects, which allows discrimination between objective colours to be 
non-transitive, and still makes room for the existence of what I have called “looks”, or more 
generally “appearances”. I have taken looks to be defined by the possibility for the subject to 
know them immediately, exhaustively and infallibly. I have suggested that this is possible if 
colours and other objective properties that are objects of perceptual judgments, are “multi-
track” powers. Each occasion of comparison between two perceptible items is a triggering 
condition, relative to which the power gives rise to a disposition to appear in a certain way to 
a given type of cognitive subject. If the subject makes a comparison judgment, the item 
appears to her in a way constituted by the judgment. The appearance results from a cognitive 
act of the subject, and is therefore directly and completely knowable by the subject.  
All other accounts of appearances we have examined either construe appearances as 
sense data (Robinson, Jackson and Pinkerton) or as contents of permanent representations. 
Such permanent representations as “qualia” (Goodman and Clark) and “phenomenal 
properties” (Hardin, Hellie) are powers rather than manifestations of powers, in the sense that 
they are not directly and completely manifest to the subject. The content of representations, 
whether sharp or “determinate” (Goodman, Clark) or spread out or “determinable” (Hardin, 
Hellie), can only be explored and completely known with scientific methods. Such 
representations and their contents are not looks in our sense because they are not immediately 
accessible to the subject. 
If looks are construed as contents of perceptual judgments, they are ephemeral, in the 
sense that their existence is limited to a particular situation. This is a consequence of the fact 
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that they are manifestations rather than powers. Here lies the main difference between our 
proposal and the accounts we have considered. Permanent representations, such as 
Goodman’s qualia and determinable qualities in a psychological space, are powerful 
properties. Just as objective powerful properties (such as the objective colours of perceived 
objects), the representations a subject forms of the colours she perceives are powerful 
properties of the subject. Both are only indirectly accessible to the subject. The subject 
acquires new partial knowledge on both objective and subjective powerful properties each 
time she makes a perceptual judgment. Each acquisition of such partial knowledge gives rise 
to an appearance, so that the appearance itself is completely knowable by the subject. 
However, this knowledge concerns only an ephemeral manifestation, not a power, and is 
therefore of very limited use
26
.  
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